# Saturday Quiz – July 23, 2011 – answers and discussion

Here are the answers with discussion for yesterday’s quiz. The information provided should help you work out why you missed a question or three! If you haven’t already done the Quiz from yesterday then have a go at it before you read the answers. I hope this helps you develop an understanding of modern monetary theory (MMT) and its application to macroeconomic thinking. Comments as usual welcome, especially if I have made an error.

Question 1:

Irrespective of what the government does, the private domestic sector can save overall, as long as the net exports are positive.

This is a question about the relative magnitude of the sectoral balances – the government budget balance, the external balance and the private domestic balance. The balances taken together always add to zero because they are derived as an accounting identity from the national accounts. The balances reflect the underlying economic behaviour in each sector which is interdependent – given this is a macroeconomic system we are considering.

To refresh your memory the balances are derived as follows. The basic income-expenditure model in macroeconomics can be viewed in (at least) two ways: (a) from the perspective of the sources of spending; and (b) from the perspective of the uses of the income produced. Bringing these two perspectives (of the same thing) together generates the sectoral balances.

From the sources perspective we write:

GDP = C + I + G + (X – M)

which says that total national income (GDP) is the sum of total final consumption spending (C), total private investment (I), total government spending (G) and net exports (X – M).

From the uses perspective, national income (GDP) can be used for:

GDP = C + S + T

which says that GDP (income) ultimately comes back to households who consume (C), save (S) or pay taxes (T) with it once all the distributions are made.

Equating these two perspectives we get:

C + S + T = GDP = C + I + G + (X – M)

So after simplification (but obeying the equation) we get the sectoral balances view of the national accounts.

(I – S) + (G – T) + (X – M) = 0

That is the three balances have to sum to zero. The sectoral balances derived are:

• The private domestic balance (I – S) – positive if in deficit, negative if in surplus.
• The Budget Deficit (G – T) – negative if in surplus, positive if in deficit.
• The Current Account balance (X – M) – positive if in surplus, negative if in deficit.

These balances are usually expressed as a per cent of GDP but that doesn’t alter the accounting rules that they sum to zero, it just means the balance to GDP ratios sum to zero.

A simplification is to add (I – S) + (X – M) and call it the non-government sector. Then you get the basic result that the government balance equals exactly \$-for-\$ (absolutely or as a per cent of GDP) the non-government balance (the sum of the private domestic and external balances).

This is also a basic rule derived from the national accounts and has to apply at all times.

The following graph with accompanying data table lets you see the evolution of the balances expressed in terms of percent of GDP. In each period I just held the budget balance at a constant surplus (2 per cent of GDP) (green bars). This is is artificial because as economic activity changes the automatic stabilisers would lead to endogenous changes in the budget balance. But we will just assume there is no change for simplicity. It doesn’t violate the logic.

To aid interpretation remember that (I-S) > 0 means that the private domestic sector is spending more than they are earning; that (G-T) < 0 means that the government is running a surplus because T > G; and (X-M) < 0 means the external position is in deficit because imports are greater than exports.

If the nation is running an external surplus it means that the contribution to aggregate demand from the external sector is positive – that is net addition to spending which would increase output and national income.

The external surplus also means that foreigners are decreasing financial claims denominated in the local currency. Given that exports represent a real cost and imports a real benefit, the motivation for a nation running a net exports surplus (the exporting nation in this case) must be to accumulate financial claims (assets) denominated in the currency of the nation running the external deficit.

A fiscal surplus means the government is spending less than it is taking out of the economy via taxations which puts a drag on aggregate demand and constrains the ability of the economy to grow. So the question is what are the relative magnitudes of the external add and the budget subtract from income?

The following graph shows the range of options for a given external surplus (of 2 per cent of GDP).

In Periods 1 to 5, the private sector is saving because the public sector does not negate the overall contribution of the external sector to demand and hence growth. Clearly, the larger is the budget deficit the greater is the capacity of the private sector to save overall because the growth in income would be stronger.

In Periods 4 and 5, the budget moves from deficit to balance then surplus, yet the private sector can still net save. That is because the fiscal drag coming from the budget in Period 4 is zero and in Period 5 less than the aggregate demand add derived from the external sector.

In Periods 6 and 7, the private sector stops net saving because the fiscal drag coming from the budget surplus offsets (Period 6) and then overwhelms (Period 7) the aggregate demand add from the external sector.

The general rule when the economy runs an external surplus is that the private domestic sector will be able to net save if the budget surplus is less than the external surplus.

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Question 2:

The payment to the private banks on reserves they hold with the central bank reduces their incentive to advance credit to the private sector.

The facts are as follows. First, central banks will always provided enough reserve balances to the commercial banks at a price it sets using a combination of overdraft/discounting facilities and open market operations.

Second, if the central bank didn’t provide the reserves necessary to match the growth in deposits in the commercial banking system then the payments system would grind to a halt and there would be significant hikes in the interbank rate of interest and a wedge between it and the policy (target) rate – meaning the central bank’s policy stance becomes compromised.

Third, any reserve requirements within this context while legally enforceable (via fines etc) do not constrain the commercial bank credit creation capacity. Central bank reserves (the accounts the commercial banks keep with the central bank) are not used to make loans. They only function to facilitate the payments system (apart from satisfying any reserve requirements).

Fourth, banks make loans to credit-worthy borrowers and these loans create deposits. If the commercial bank in question is unable to get the reserves necessary to meet the requirements from other sources (other banks) then the central bank has to provide them. But the process of gaining the necessary reserves is a separate and subsequent bank operation to the deposit creation (via the loan).

Fifth, if there were too many reserves in the system (relative to the banks’ desired levels to facilitate the payments system and the required reserves then competition in the interbank (overnight) market would drive the interest rate down. This competition would be driven by banks holding surplus reserves (to their requirements) trying to lend them overnight. The opposite would happen if there were too few reserves supplied by the central bank. Then the chase for overnight funds would drive rates up.

In both cases the central bank would lose control of its current policy rate as the divergence between it and the interbank rate widened. This divergence can snake between the rate that the central bank pays on excess reserves (this rate varies between countries and overtime but before the crisis was zero in Japan and the US) and the penalty rate that the central bank seeks for providing the commercial banks access to the overdraft/discount facility.

So the aim of the central bank is to issue just as many reserves that are required for the law and the banks’ own desires.

But banks do not lend reserves. They are used to facilitate the so-called payments system so that all transactions that are drawn on the various banks (cheques etc) clear at the end of each day. Clearly banks prefer to earn a return on reserves that it deems are in excess of its clearing house (payments system) requirements.

But in the absence of such a return being paid by the central bank the only consequence would be that the banks (overall) would have zero interest balances.

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Question 3:

An indicator of the impact the recession has had on credit creation is the fact that the growth of bank reserves and the growth in the stock of money have not followed a similar path in recent years.

It has been demonstrated beyond doubt that there is no unique relationship of the sort characterised by the erroneous money multiplier model in mainstream economics textbooks between bank reserves and the “stock of money”.

You will note that in MMT there is very little spoken about the money supply. In an endogenous money world there is very little meaning in the aggregate.

Central banks do still publish data on various measures of “money”. The RBA, for example, provides data for:

• Currency – Private non-bank sector’s holdings of notes and coins.
• Current deposits with banks (which exclude Australian and State Government and inter-bank deposits).
• The M1 measure – Currency plus bank current deposits of the private non-bank sector.
• The M3 measure – M1 plus all other ADI deposits of the private non-ADI sector. So a broader measure than M1.
• Broad money – M3 plus non-deposit borrowings from the private sector by AFIs, less the holdings of currency and bank deposits by RFCs and cash management trusts.
• Money base – Holdings of notes and coins by the private sector, plus deposits of banks with the Reserve Bank and other Reserve Bank liabilities to the private non-bank sector.

Note that ADI are Australian deposit-taking institutions; AFI are Australian financial intermediaries; and the RFCs are Registered Financial Corporations. Here is the RBA’s excellent glossary for future reference.

The mainstream theory of money and monetary policy asserts that the money supply (volume) is determined exogenously by the central bank. That is, they have the capacity to set this volume independent of the market. The monetarist portfolio approach claims that the money supply will reflect the central bank injection of high-powered (base) money and the preferences of private agents to hold that money. This is the so-called money multiplier.

So the central bank is alleged to exploit this multiplier (based on private portfolio preferences for cash and the reserve ratio of banks) and manipulate its control over base money to control the money supply.

To some extent these ideas were a residual of the commodity money systems where the central bank could clearly control the stock of gold, for example. But in a credit money system, this ability to control the stock of “money” is undermined by the demand for credit.

The theory of endogenous money is central to the horizontal analysis in MMT. When we talk about endogenous money we are referring to the outcomes that are arrived at after market participants respond to their own market prospects and central bank policy settings and make decisions about the liquid assets they will hold (deposits) and new liquid assets they will seek (loans).

The essential idea is that the “money supply” in an “entrepreneurial economy” is demand-determined – as the demand for credit expands so does the money supply. As credit is repaid the money supply shrinks. These flows are going on all the time and the stock measure we choose to call the money supply, say M3 is just an arbitrary reflection of the credit circuit.

So the supply of money is determined endogenously by the level of GDP, which means it is a dynamic (rather than a static) concept.

Central banks clearly do not determine the volume of deposits held each day. These arise from decisions by commercial banks to make loans.

The central bank can determine the price of “money” by setting the interest rate on bank reserves. Further expanding the monetary base (bank reserves) as we have argued in recent blogs – Building bank reserves will not expand credit and Building bank reserves is not inflationary – does not lead to an expansion of credit.

So a rising ratio of bank reserves to some measure like M3 is consistent with the view that credit creation is being constrained by some factor – such as a recession.

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Question 4:

Rising government net spending (budget deficit) indicates that the government fiscal stance is becoming more expansionary.

Intuitively, we might think that if the deficit rises the government must be pursuing an expansionary fiscal policy. But intuition is not always a good guide and doesn’t replace understanding.

The question is exploring the issue of decomposing the observed budget balance into the discretionary (now called structural) and cyclical components. The latter component is driven by the automatic stabilisers that are in-built into the budget process.

The budget balance is the difference between total government revenue and total government outlays. So if total revenue is greater than outlays, the budget is in surplus and vice versa. It is a simple matter of accounting with no theory involved. However, the budget balance is used by all and sundry to indicate the fiscal stance of the government.

So if the budget is in surplus it is often concluded that the fiscal impact of government is contractionary (withdrawing net spending) and if the budget is in deficit we say the fiscal impact expansionary (adding net spending).

Further, a rising deficit (falling surplus) is often considered to be reflecting an expansionary policy stance and vice versa. What we know is that a rising deficit may, in fact, indicate a contractionary fiscal stance – which, in turn, creates such income losses that the automatic stabilisers start driving the budget back towards (or into) deficit.

So the complication is that we cannot conclude that changes in the fiscal impact reflect discretionary policy changes. The reason for this uncertainty clearly relates to the operation of the automatic stabilisers.

To see this, the most simple model of the budget balance we might think of can be written as:

Budget Balance = Revenue – Spending.

Budget Balance = (Tax Revenue + Other Revenue) – (Welfare Payments + Other Spending)

We know that Tax Revenue and Welfare Payments move inversely with respect to each other, with the latter rising when GDP growth falls and the former rises with GDP growth. These components of the budget balance are the so-called automatic stabilisers

In other words, without any discretionary policy changes, the budget balance will vary over the course of the business cycle. When the economy is weak – tax revenue falls and welfare payments rise and so the budget balance moves towards deficit (or an increasing deficit). When the economy is stronger – tax revenue rises and welfare payments fall and the budget balance becomes increasingly positive. Automatic stabilisers attenuate the amplitude in the business cycle by expanding the budget in a recession and contracting it in a boom.

So just because the budget goes into deficit doesn’t allow us to conclude that the Government has suddenly become of an expansionary mind. In other words, the presence of automatic stabilisers make it hard to discern whether the fiscal policy stance (chosen by the government) is contractionary or expansionary at any particular point in time.

To overcome this uncertainty, economists devised what used to be called the Full Employment or High Employment Budget. In more recent times, this concept is now called the Structural Balance. The change in nomenclature is very telling because it occurred over the period that neo-liberal governments began to abandon their commitments to maintaining full employment and instead decided to use unemployment as a policy tool to discipline inflation.

The Full Employment Budget Balance was a hypothetical construct of the budget balance that would be realised if the economy was operating at potential or full employment. In other words, calibrating the budget position (and the underlying budget parameters) against some fixed point (full capacity) eliminated the cyclical component – the swings in activity around full employment.

So a full employment budget would be balanced if total outlays and total revenue were equal when the economy was operating at total capacity. If the budget was in surplus at full capacity, then we would conclude that the discretionary structure of the budget was contractionary and vice versa if the budget was in deficit at full capacity.

The calculation of the structural deficit spawned a bit of an industry in the past with lots of complex issues relating to adjustments for inflation, terms of trade effects, changes in interest rates and more.

Much of the debate centred on how to compute the unobserved full employment point in the economy. There were a plethora of methods used in the period of true full employment in the 1960s. All of them had issues but like all empirical work – it was a dirty science – relying on assumptions and simplifications. But that is the nature of the applied economist’s life.

As I explain in the blogs cited below, the measurement issues have a long history and current techniques and frameworks based on the concept of the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (the NAIRU) bias the resulting analysis such that actual discretionary positions which are contractionary are seen as being less so and expansionary positions are seen as being more expansionary.

The result is that modern depictions of the structural deficit systematically understate the degree of discretionary contraction coming from fiscal policy.

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Greece will only start to reduce its public debt ratio when the government can run primary budget surpluses.

While Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) places no particular importance in the public debt to GDP ratio for a sovereign government, given that insolvency is not an issue, the mainstream debate is dominated by the concept. The unnecessary practice of fiat currency-issuing governments of issuing public debt \$-for-\$ to match public net spending (deficits) ensures that the debt levels will always rise when there are deficits.

But the rising debt levels do not necessarily have to rise at the same rate as GDP grows. The question is about the debt ratio not the level of debt per se.

Rising deficits often are associated with declining economic activity (especially if there is no evidence of accelerating inflation) which suggests that the debt/GDP ratio may be rising because the denominator is also likely to be falling or rising below trend.

Further, historical experience tells us that when economic growth resumes after a major recession, during which the public debt ratio can rise sharply, the latter always declines again.

It is this endogenous nature of the ratio that suggests it is far more important to focus on the underlying economic problems which the public debt ratio just mirrors.

The mainstream framework for analysing the dynamics in public debt ratios starts with the concept of the government budget constraint (GBC). The GBC says that the budget deficit in year t is equal to the change in government debt over year t plus the change in high powered money over year t. So in mathematical terms it is written as:

which you can read in English as saying that Budget deficit = Government spending + Government interest payments – Tax receipts must equal (be “financed” by) a change in Bonds (B) and/or a change in high powered money (H). The triangle sign (delta) is just shorthand for the change in a variable.

However, this is merely an accounting statement. In a stock-flow consistent macroeconomics, this statement will always hold. That is, it has to be true if all the transactions between the government and non-government sector have been correctly added and subtracted.

For a sovereign government that issues its own currency, the previous equation is just an ex post accounting identity that has to be true by definition and has no real economic importance.

However, for Greece, which has ceded its currency sovereignty, the GBC becomes an financial constraints given that it has to fund its spending from taxation and/or bond issues.

A primary budget balance is the difference between government spending (excluding interest rate servicing) and taxation revenue.

The standard mainstream framework is usually expressed in terms of the ratio of debt to GDP rather than the level of debt per se. Even so-called progressives (deficit-doves) use this framework as if it applies to all governments.

The following equation captures the approach:

So the change in the debt ratio is the sum of two terms on the right-hand side: (a) the difference between the real interest rate (r) and the GDP growth rate (g) times the initial debt ratio; and (b) the ratio of the primary deficit (G-T) to GDP.

The real interest rate is the difference between the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate.

This standard mainstream framework is used to highlight the dangers of running deficits. But even progressives (not me) use it in a perverse way to justify deficits in a downturn balanced by surpluses in the upturn.

Many mainstream economists and a fair number of so-called progressive economists say that governments should as some point in the business cycle run primary surpluses (taxation revenue in excess of non-interest government spending) to start reducing the debt ratio back to “safe” territory.

Almost all the media commentators that you read on this topic take it for granted that the only way to reduce the public debt ratio is to run primary surpluses. That is what the whole “credible exit strategy” rhetoric is about and what is driving the austerity push around the world at present.

So the question is whether continuous national governments deficits imply continuously rising public debt levels as a percentage of GDP and whether primary budget surpluses are required to reduce the public debt ratio.

While MMT advocates running budget deficits when they are necessary to fill a spending gap left by non-government saving, it also emphasises that a government running a deficit can also reduce the debt ratio if it stimulates growth.

The standard formula above can easily demonstrate that a nation running a primary deficit can reduce its public debt ratio over time.

Furthermore, depending on contributions from the external sector, a nation running a deficit will more likely create the conditions for a reduction in the public debt ratio than a nation that introduces an austerity plan aimed at running primary surpluses.

Here is why that is the case. A growing economy can absorb more debt and keep the debt ratio constant or falling. From the formula above, if the primary budget balance is zero, public debt increases at a rate r but the public debt ratio increases at rg.

The orthodox economists use this analysis to argue that permanent deficits are bad because the financial markets will “penalise” a government living on debt. If the public debt ratio is “too high” (whatever that is or means), markets “lose faith” in the government.

Consider the following Table which shows two years in the life of an economy.

It keeps things simple by assuming a public debt ratio at the start of the period of 100 per cent (so B/Y(-1) = 1).

Assume that the real rate of interest is 0 (so the nominal interest rate equals the inflation rate) – not to dissimilar to the situation at present in many countries.

Assume that the rate of real GDP growth is minus 2 per cent (that is, the nation is in recession) and the automatic stabilisers push the primary budget balance into deficit equal to 1 per cent of GDP. As a consequence, the public debt ratio will rise by 3 per cent. So in Year 2, the debt ratio is 1.03 of GDP.

The government reacts to the recession in the correct manner and increases its discretionary net spending to take the deficit in Year 2 to 2 per cent of GDP (noting a positive number in this instance is a deficit).

The central bank maintains its zero interest rate policy and the inflation rate also remains at zero so the real interest rate doesn’t move.

The increasing deficit stimulates economic growth in Year 2 such that real GDP grows by 3 per cent. In this case the public debt ratio falls by 1 per cent.

So even with an increasing (or unchanged) deficit, real GDP growth can reduce the public debt ratio, which is what has happened many times in past history following economic slowdowns.

In other words, Greece does not have to run budget surpluses to bring its public debt ratio down. What it needs is growth and that is more likely to occur if it holds its nerve and runs deficits. The problem is that the membership of the EMU (lack of currency sovereignty) makes that difficult without ECB support.

The best way to reduce the public debt ratio is to stop issuing debt. A sovereign government doesn’t have to issue debt if the central bank is happy to keep its target interest rate at zero or pay interest on excess reserves.

The discussion also demonstrates why tightening monetary policy makes it harder for the government to reduce the public debt ratio – which, of-course, is one of the more subtle mainstream ways to force the government to run surpluses.

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1. Fed Up says:

“Second, if the central bank didn’t provide the reserves necessary to match the growth in deposits in the commercial banking system then the payments system would grind to a halt and there would be significant hikes in the interbank rate of interest and a wedge between it and the policy (target) rate – meaning the central bank’s policy stance becomes compromised.

Third, any reserve requirements within this context while legally enforceable (via fines etc) do not constrain the commercial bank credit creation capacity. Central bank reserves (the accounts the commercial banks keep with the central bank) are not used to make loans. They only function to facilitate the payments system (apart from satisfying any reserve requirements).”

Instead of providing central bank reserves, can the central bank just lower the reserve requirement on demand deposits and/or allow sweeps accounts?

Are central bank reserves a type of medium of exchange in the banking system ONLY covered by the central bank (its member banks) with the central bank reserve being an asset to the member bank(s) and a liability to the central bank?

“But in the absence of such a return being paid by the central bank the only consequence would be that the banks (overall) would have zero interest balances.”

What would happen if the central bank had a negative interest rate on excess central bank reserves?

2. Fed Up says:

Q3, “the fact that the growth of bank reserves and the growth in the stock of money have followed a similar path in recent years.” from the question.

“It has been demonstrated beyond doubt that there is no unique relationship of the sort characterised by the erroneous money multiplier model in mainstream economics textbooks between bank reserves and the “stock of money”.”

My assumption is the “stock of money” is actually the medium of exchange supply.

I’m confused. Isn’t the so-called fact wrong? Central bank reserves went up a lot, but the “stock of money” is flat and would be down without gov’t debt. If the so-called fact is wrong, why isn’t the answer false?

3. B2R says:

I’m with Fed Up on #3. At least for the USA, bank reserves and thus the monetary base have grown enormously, while none of the accepted measures of money in circulation beyond the base have risen much. I said “False” for that reason, and even rereading the question I see no way that an answer of “True” can be justified — the “fact” is not a fact.

4. Andrewjudd says:

On endogenous credit creation, we probably all want more money on terms that are good for us. But this is not something we can demand as such. We can though request credit and bust our balls to meet the banks criteria and pay their fees and face the consequences of our actions.

“credit is demand driven” must therefore contain some assumptions?

One assumption is that the bank does not require reserves. But that contains the assumption that the reserves the bank almost certainly does have now are not required for the loan. For example what percentage of loans issued by NAB are in excess of the current cash and reserve balance holdings of NAB? It must be a very small percentage?
Another assumption is that the particular bank does not operate an in house monetary policy where it obtains reserves first or gets lines of credit first before it issues loans. (and here i think it ok to say that high quality bonds are reserve like. We can agree that the bonds are a reserve of wealth or capital)
Another assumption of a similar nature is that a bank does not preposition itself to issue loans by advertising and establishing back up lines of credit, but instead it just waits till loans are demanded. This does not reflect the real world.

5. John Armour says:

Andrewjudd at 16.23
Is it possible you still think that reserves are somehow required to meet the bank’s lending commitments ?
Bill’s choice of wording on this can seem ambiguous when first encountered, or even contradictory against his assertion that banks do not lend reserves. I know I had trouble with it:
” If the commercial bank in question is unable to get the reserves necessary to meet the requirements from other sources (other banks) then the central bank has to provide them. But the process of gaining the necessary reserves is a separate and subsequent bank operation to the deposit creation (via the loan).”
In Australia there are no reserve requirements (as in some specified fraction of deposits) other than the bank shall ensure it has sufficient reserves (I think of it as a “float”) to cover its cheque clearing obligations.
A commercial bank creates loans out of thin air, without regard to its reserve holdings. Its only restraint is its capital base (mainly common stock). The so-called Basel Rules cover all that.
The more loans a bank writes, the higher the volume of traffic through its Exchange Settlement Account at the RBA, the more “float” reserves it will need. I guess you could call this a second order effect.
When our banks are seeking to attract deposits, they are not needed for on-lending, but merely to keep their reserve accounts topped up.
If I’ve misunderstood your question and this is all “old hat”, my apologies

6. John Armour says:

Bill,
If the US Fed now pays interest on reserve balances equal to the target rate, surely that means Treasury doesn’t have to issue debt, \$ for \$, to cover net spending, as required under the convention ?
It seems to me it’s got to be one or the other. I know the rate is close to zero, but it’s still +ve. They can’t pay interest on both ?
And, if this is the case, doesn’t it call “times up” on the fiction that the borrowings “fund” the deficit ?
Likewise, the fiction that OMO’s purpose is controlling the money supply ?

From your April 2010 essay “Understanding Central Bank Operations”

“But the conduct of fiscal policy is executed within institutional structures that do not allow these reserve excesses to occur to any degree. So governments have volunatarily introduced legislation or regulations that force it to issue debt to match their net spending – in some cases the former has to come before the latter. Under these institutional constraints, it is not accurate to say that budget deficits drive down or put downward pressure on interest rates. If the governments abandoned these gold standard/convertible currency artefacts, which are totally unnecessary in a fiat currency system, then budget deficits would force the central bank to issue debt to maintain a positive interest rate target (that is, to drain the excess reserves).”

7. J.V. Dubois says:

I have problem with 2 answers.

2) Reserves. I do get all your arguments that it is creditworthy customers who drive the lending and that the banks do not NEED reserves to provide loans. However is it also not true that the interst rate set by CB plays some role in risk-assesment of potential borrower? Thus lowering the interest rate could mean that there are some people who move to creditworthy category meaning that banks will be able to borrow more? Also the argument that banks clear their reserves at the end of the day is not that convincing since 1) it is the target interest set by CB that makes them clear at any given level 2) there are times such as these when banks do not clear their reserve position at all. Or do you honestly think that if FED would stop paying 0,25% for bank reserves that this would have no impact on bank lending?

4) This is pure sophism. You presume, that if someone answered “Increasing budget deficits makes fiscal stance more expansionary” that such person automatically thinks that the overall fiscal stance is expansionary. This is just a straw-man word game. “More expansionary” may in this case just mean “less- contractionary” (since you have only True or False as possible answers) without having overall ficscal stance on mind.

I always hated these kind of ambiguous questions, which turns into psychology game like “taking into account how the teacher talks during lectures what the hell could he truly meran by this question?”. But these kinds of question do not work very well over the internet, especially since you may have non native english audience who may not be that much into language nuances.

5) Isn’t it much easier to answer this question like “False, since debt-to-GDP ratio may change by growing GDP. If the growth is faster then deficit acumulation we may have shrinking debt-to-GDP ratio even with primary deficit.”

8. B2R says:

Guess Bill doesn’t consider the factual issue in #3 worth a comment…

9. Dear B2R (at 2011/07/27 at 10:58)

Your comment was correct and I have amended the question. I just haven’t had the time to attend to it before now and I try not to deal with the blog at weekends if I can help it.

Sorry if you thought I was ignoring your input which is welcome (same goes for Fed Up).

best wishes
bill

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