On May 11, 2017, the European Central Bank (ECB) released its third Economic Bulletin for the year, the release date comes two weeks after each of their monetary policy meetings. In Issue 3, there is some interesting analysis on both the state of youth unemployment and the degree of labour market slack in the Eurozone. It doesn’t paint a very rosy picture despite the constant claims that the Eurozone is recovering well. The reality is that while the official unemployment rate is bad enough (still above the pre-crisis level and stuck at around 9.5 per cent), the broader measures of labour slack indicate that around 18.5 per cent (at least) of the productive labour resources in the Eurozone are lying idle in one form or another. The broad slack has also risen during the crisis in most nations – particularly underemployment. In other words, the Eurozone remains in much worse shape than some official statistics might suggest. And we are nearly a decade into the crisis (and so-called ‘recovery’).

It is fiscal statement (aka ‘budget’) frenzy in Australia at present, with the Treasurer about to bring down the annual policy strategy tonight. There is so much claptrap in the press and electronic media that I have tried to avoid saying anything about it. I may stick to that. I have been trying to understand the French election results though. That has occupied my attention a bit given the success of Macron (where a record number of voters stayed away and he barely scraped through the first round). He will be proven to be duplicitious I think. He is a Eurocentric neo-liberal who is anti-union, largely, anti-regulation and state intervention and believes the ‘market’ and an incentivised middle-class will do the trick for France. He is caught up in the Europe thing and so cannot see that the Eurozone straitjacket will ensure a growing underclass is retained. There was some interesting research published by a private investment bank (BOAML) – Job Quality and Escape Velocity – which provides a rather sombre view of the much-touted Eurozone ‘recovery’ over the last three years.

On March 24, 2017, the Portuguese government (via Instituto Nacional de Estatística or Statistics Portugal) sent Eurostat its – Excessive Deficit Procedure (1st Notification) – 2017 – which is part of the formal process of the EU surveillance on the fiscal policy outcomes for Member States. The data submitted to the EU showed that the Government had reduced its fiscal deficit from 4.4 per cent in 2015 to 2.1 per cent in 2016, thus bringing it within the Stability and Growth Pact rules (below 3 per cent). However its public debt to GDP ratio rose modestly over that time from 129 per cent to 130.4 per cent. The other stunning fact presented, which hasn’t received much attention in the media, was that government spending on gross fixed capital formation fell from 4,049.3 million euros in 2015 to 2,879.6 million euros in 2016, a 29 per cent decline. Further, real GDP growth has been positive for the several quarters now and this has boosted tax revenue. The popular press has been claiming this is a Keynesian miracle – spawning growth and cutting the fiscal deficit. There is some truth to the statement that the ‘Socialist’ government has reversed some of the worst austerity policies introduced by the previous right-wing government, acting as puppets of the Troika. But what has been going on in Portugal highlights the myopia inherent in the restrictive Eurozone fiscal rules, which promote very short-term behaviour on the part of the Member State governments. As Portugal is currently demonstrating, it is prepared (and is motivated by the fiscal rules) to sacrifice sustained prosperity for short-term appeasement of Brussels. Short-term growth can occur within limits at the expense of long-run potential.

The new US President has now scrapped the TPP and is turning his attention to NAFTA. These are developments that those on the Left should applaud. No so the conservative, neo-liberal government in Australia which is claiming it is pushing ahead with the TPP (sure, with Indonesia) and hinting that China might be part of a new TPP arrangement sans the US. That, in itself, is incredible given that the TPP was designed to counter the growing trade strength of China. But the ground is certainly shifting. Even the IMF is embracing China and added the Renminbi to the Special Drawing Rights basket last September (along with the USD, the euro, Yen and pound), which is recognition that the IMF doesn’t think the Chinese have been manipulating the currency – one of the paranoid claims of the new US President. But in Europe, people are getting anxious after the President of the ECB Mario Draghi decided to put pressure on Italy with threats they would owe the Eurosystem (through the Banca d’Italia) some 358.6 billion euros, which are that nation’s TARGET2 liabilities as at November 2016. The real currency manipulator, German who continues to game its Eurozone partners (via an undervalued euro) is also claiming it is owed cash as a result of its increasing TARGET2 assets. The threat from Draghi is hollow and Italy should just ignore it and get on with leaving the Eurozone and restoring its prosperity as an independent currency-issuing state.

I read a short discussion paper this morning – What model for the future of the eurozone? Critical actions – released by France Stratégie, which is formally known as the Commissariat général à la stratégie et à la prospective (CGSP). It is a government body attached to the Prime Minister’s office. It was created in April 2013 Its mission is to provide broad discussion parameters to aid future policy directions for the French government. The discussion paper provides nothing new and seems to avoid the realities of the European cultural and historical milieu that really dominates or constrains (whichever way you want to think about it) the possible routes back to prosperity for the continent. It lists three options for reforming the Eurozone: (a) Return to original principles (Maastricht 2.0) where nations were fiscally separate and there would be no bailouts; (b) Reinforced fiscal integration with “joint liability for sovereign debt” and control of “national parliaments’ fiscal sovereignty’ by some European-level institution (Commission/Parliament); and a (c) a US federal model. They are motivated by the conclusion that the current situation is “ineffective”, which is a euphemism for total dead-in-the-water failure. They do not broach the most obvious and, in the long-run, best solution, which is consistent with the cultural and historical realities – orderly breakup and return to true currency sovereignty. So the discussion paper really offers very little by way of a path out of the maresme that the elites in Europe have created to line their own pockets at the expense of everyone else.

There was an interesting interview published in the financial market journal Central Banking this week with Otmar Issing, who was the ECBs first chief economist and a former European Central Bank executive board member. He predicted that as a result of the political corruption of the monetary union ideal, “the house of cards will collapse.” He was referring to the claim that the ECB has become captured by politicians and technocrats in the IMF and the European Commission such that it is now violating essential central banking principles, in addition, to Treaty obligations that were designed to safeguard the financial stability of the system. I have some agreement with his overall view that a federal solution to the Eurozone ills is not viable. But I do not agree that the ills of the Eurozone stem from recent political decisions – to pressure the ECB to engage in QE or other interventions. The reality is that the flawed design of the Eurozone, which reflected the ideological hold of neo-liberalism on the integration discussions in the 1980s and beyond, meant that the only effective fiscal capacity in the currency union was held by the ECB. If the ECB had not started buying up government bonds in May 2010, the monetary union would have collapsed about then. The whole problem is that neo-liberalism brought these Member States together into a monetary architecture that was doomed from the start.

So several investment funds based on real estate in the UK have suspended trading to stop people withdrawing their funds. Who would have thought that in a vastly overvalued UK property market that people would start to reassess the value of these investments, especially after working out (gosh!) that the mismatch in maturities in these type of funds was more or less extreme? And so the Leave vote is now being blamed on crashing a market when all that is happening is that the real estate market is starting to correct back to something less ridiculous. And talking about ridiculous. The Italian government is now coming headlong into conflict with the, now ridiculous, European Commission on the impending crash of its zombie banking sector. You might have thought we were still back in 2008 or something. No folks, this is 2016 and the Eurozone problems just keep on going. The Italian banking crisis was always going to happen – it was just a matter of when. Why? Simply because the single currency experiment has failed and the policy making process and the institutional machinery is so detached from reality – as in all cases of Groupthink – that it can no longer respond in an effective way to changing circumstances. The Eurozone is still crippled by its flawed monetary design and in more recent years the migrant issue has come over the top to reinforce this malaise. The Brexit vote outcome reflects the consequences of this dysfunction and demonstrates that a world contrived by the elites to benefit themselves is not the world of reality where things have a habit of turning sour if the rest of us are suppressed.

On December 21, 2015, there was an article on the Social Europe portal – A New Plan for Greece And Europe: A Defining Moment For European Social Democracy – which I found interesting, though very incomplete, given its title. In fact, the ‘New Plan’ is really a series of fairly general statements, which at times, are somewhat inconsistent if you extend them into the necessary detail that they imply. For example, one of their key observations is that within the European Union there is a “wide and growing gap between national control over budgets that people have voted for and the post-national governance imposed on them”. Which would suggest that the solution requires that there is an aligning of the fiscal responsibility and control at the level of the currency-issuing unit. However, there is no hint of that in their ‘Plan’. They talk about an “Enhanced respect for the fiscal sovereignty of Greece” but fail to articulate how that can occur within the common currency when the Greek government has no currency-issuing capacity. Of course, if we want to increase the fiscal sovereignty of any Eurozone nation, then the only sustainable way of doing that is for that nation to re-establish its own currency and exit the monetary union. However, this would appear contrary to their “pan-European” sentiments, which dominate their overall vision. In short, once again the bogey person of the pan-European appears to be taken as a given and then specific matters that might appear inconsistent with that old ‘social democratic’ obsession in Europe are glossed over.

Today, the Australian Treasurer will release the so-called Mid-year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO), which will reveal that the fiscal deficit has risen on the back of slower economic growth. I will comment about that and the reactions tomorrow, probably. Today’s blog is about the Eurozone, obviously one of my favourite research topics. There was an article in the UK Independent (December 14, 2015) by British economist Simon Wren-Lewis – Who is responsible for the eurozone crisis? The simple answer: Germany. The article largely avoids the question and chooses, instead, to focus on more contemporary influences which have magnified rather than caused the crisis. The article clearly blames Germany for the crisis and exonerates Greece, Ireland and Spain. However, I have argued in the past that France is largely responsible for the mess that Europe is in economically at present and it’s responsibility goes back decades before the Eurozone was even constructed. The causa causans of the Eurozone crisis is the essential design and construction of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which was never going to be capable of operating in an effective manner. Germany set in train policies that would ensure they were insulated from the wreckage that the dysfunctional system would engender. Germany ‘gamed’ a dysfunctional system for its own advantage but they didn’t create that system and in that sense they are only a causa sine qua non, rather than the essential cause.

On November 6, 2000, the Financial Times correspondent Wolfgang Münchau wrote in his article ‘Weak euro reflects uncertainty of euro-zone’ that “structural reforms alone will not determine whether the Emu is viable … The Europeans have no system of transfer payments and the EU budget is too small for this purpose … the euro-zone countries cannot remain as they are: they must move towards full economic union”. He also observed that the “current is clearly flowing in the opposite direction: EU governments increasingly emphasise inter-governmental co-operation as opposed to a wider role for supra-national institution”. I examined that ‘current’ extensively in my current book – Eurozone Dystopia: Groupthink and Denial on a Grand Scale (published May 2015) – as it was (and is) a major reason the monetary union has failed. And, further, the cultural and national barriers which prevented the creation of a system-wide fiscal union are still insurmountable. Münchau is one of several journalists and commentators who have shifted their positions on the desirability of the common currency yet remains wedded to the idea of retaining it – as if returning to national currency sovereignty would be a disaster. I opposed the Maastricht proposal when it was made public and remain opposed. Restoring national currencies, while initially disruptive will not in the long-term prove to be worse than what Münchau admits is a state where nations are “trapped in a dysfunctional monetary system”.